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Everyone who works in some relation to Native American literary culture 
will be grateful to Daniel Littlefield for addressing so forthrightly issues that have 
been growing in intensity and that have already divided "us" into several camps 
or factions.* I have adopted here, albeit in inverted commas, Littlefield's use of 
the first person plural to refer to "American scholars, American Indian as well as 
non-Indian, who are products of Western educational philosophies and whose 
scholarly research and writing and teaching relate to American Indians."1 This is 
what Littlefield says he means "By we, here and below." (108n) 
But this is not how he actually uses the pronoun. Throughout Littlefield's 
talk, "we" effectively means non-Indian scholars as in such sentences as " . . . each 
of us must decide if we care what opinions Indians have of what we write or say 
about them," (107) or, ".. we can do nothing, try to ignore what the Indians say, 
and go on about our business as usual . . . ," (101) or, "No wonder American 
Indians say that what we do has little or no relation to them " (104) There are 
dozens of other such sentences. In these, Littlefield constructs the category of 
"Indians" as a "them" set against a non-Indian "us"; he thus perpetuates exactly 
the opposition his remarks ostensibly seek to undo. 
But the situation is much more complex than any simple opposition can 
convey. Neither Native scholars nor non-Native scholars can legitimately be 
represented as a singleminded, unified group with a consensual position on the 
issues in question. Indians don't all see eye to eye any more than non-Indians do. 
Moreover, Littlefield uses the term "Indians" ambiguously. For the most part, 
"Indians" is a term that does, indeed, refer to Native scholars, academic Indians. 
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Sometimes, however, "Indians" seems to refer to Native people who do not "write 
culture," so much as they (en)act, or produce it, and by no means necessarily in 
accord with "Western academic philosophies." Still, all of Littlefield's "Indi-
ans," scholars or not, are, as I have said, portrayed as acting as a more or less united 
force to defend against, police, guard turf, or otherwise resist "our" ongoing 
depredations. "We" non-Natives, scholars only, are also presented 
monolithically—for all that some of "us" are definitely worse than others; and 
names are named. 
In what follows, I'll try to offer some thoughts about the many issues 
Littlefield raises, for all that the way in which he raises these issues, his almost 
exclusive focus on an oppositional version of identity politics—us/them, Indians/ 
non-Indians, etc., what the anthropologist Terence Turner calls "difference 
multiculturalism,"2 does not seem to me a very fruitful line of approach. I will 
offer only one among the many reasons I think this: this line of approach cannot 
help but blur, far more than our historical moment necessitates, the epistemologi-
cal distinctions between dialectical rationality, logic, or philosophy, and rhetoric, 
what one says as an aspiration to "truth" and what one says as an aspiration to 
worldly effectivity. What Plato didn't bother to note (but Sartre did3), was that to 
claim to speak in the name of "truth" requires a relatively unembattled and secure 
subject-position. But identity or difference politics in the academy today arise 
most acutely among those who feel themselves embattled and insecure; for them, 
or even some of "us"—the pronoun references remain highly charged and 
problematical—rhetorical rather than logical principles tend to predominate, as 
they (but also some of us) seek to contest the material conditions that keep them 
(but also some of us) from a relatively untroubled relation to what rationality one 
may still decently believe in today. 
What Littlefield has tapped is a vein of ressentiment, and a rich one; what, 
after all, should oppressed people feel but resentment and anger. But it never 
occurs to him to attempt to distinguish (not that it is all that easy to distinguish) 
between statements that seek to present logical arguments and statements that 
may be offered primarily for their rhetorical or political effect. (And, again, I have 
no illusions that logic and rhetoric can be neatly separated.) Thus, Littlefield finds 
himself constantly in the position of trying to produce logical support for 
statements that, so it seems to me, are essentially political gestures. This is an 
impossible task, and it has the effect of muddying further the waters Littlefield 
would clear. 
After more than half a century in this world, I still tend to believe that the 
truth—I've dropped the protective quotation marks—can make us free; and that 
truth, however much decentered, qualified and relativized, may be approached by 
rational and logical procedures that are not strictly "Western" or "Eurocentric" 
but panhuman. In what follows I will do my best to argue logically and rationally; 
as a non-Indian, perhaps I have that luxury; as a non-Indian, I also have that 
responsibility. But I want to be very clear about the fact that even as I logically 
interrogate the arguments of some of the Native scholars Littlefield cites— 
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arguments, as I have said, that often seem to me not so much arguments as 
rhetorical gestures—I do so in a spirit of solidarity. That Native American 
scholars feel the need to defend their right to speak about Native American culture 
"by any means necessary" (Malcolm X, via Spike Lee) is entirely understandable. 
Let me try to make this point statistically before going further. 
In 1986, minorities accounted for 22.4% of American high school graduates; 
of these, only .7% were American Indian. Projected figures for 1995 are 27.7% 
for all minorities, but only .8% for Native Americans (largest increases are 
projected for Asian and Hispanic people).4 Minorities accounted for 12.5% of all 
Bachelor's degrees in 1986-7, the last year for which I have figures, with 
American Indian B.A. recipients numbering .4% in all fields, by far the lowest 
percentage for any minority group.5 For doctoral degrees granted in 1989-90,1 
have figures only by fields: in all humanities fields, 9.2% of the doctorates granted 
were to minority students, with American Indians numbering .3% of that total. 
Only . 1 % of the doctoral degrees granted to American Indians were in the field 
of English and American literature, with another .3% in Modern Foreign 
Languages.6 These statistics make it very clear that an ongoing domestic impe-
rialism has been quite successful in keeping the Native population from the 
"benefits" of higher education. Academic Indians—the statistics for minority 
faculty members that I have been able to find are unclear in that the categories they 
specify other than "white" are only Hispanic and Non-Hispanic—are a species 
currently in danger of extinction. Obviously Native American scholars have got 
to "fight back," in Simon Ortiz's phrase, in any way they can. One way to "fight 
back," if not the only way, is by marshalling facts and clear arguments. 
In what follows, I offer remarks arranged in five (overlapping) categories; 
these are offered critically, but sympathetically as a response to Dan Littlefield's 
important address. 
1. The problem of the double bind. 
Double binds are situations in which you're damned if you do and damned 
if you don't. They are logically untenable and, to those who experience them, 
practically intolerable. It is illogical and intolerable, for example, for non-Native 
scholars to be excoriated for failing to include Native American materials in their 
teaching/writing on American history/culture/literature, and also excoriated 
when they do include them on the grounds of colonial appropriation, "speaking 
for others," experiential inadequacy, or inauthenticity. 
If, as Phillip S. Deloria has claimed, a failure to be critical of Indians smacks 
of arrogant and critically blind romantic idealization (Littlefield 96); but, if an 
intense critique of Indian self-identifications, as, for example, in some of the work 
of James Clifton, is dismissed in toto as "racist," then we have a potential double 
bind.7 For a Native scholar to denigrate the work of a prominent non-Native 
scholar by suggesting that he has probably not ever been to a powwow but, then 
to publish remarks ridiculing non-Indians at powwows is to set up a double bind.8 
To take seriously the advice of Simon Ortiz, Alfonso Ortiz, Gerald Vizenor, 
N. Scott Momaday, Louise Erdrich, and many other Native people to the effect 
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that if America is to survive, it had better learn something from the Indian—and 
then to find a wide range of attempts to learn categorized as intellectual tourism, 
cultural imperialism, or the imposition of an unjust burden on the Indian, is to find 
oneself in a double bind.9 
Native critiques of the kinds of inclusions Native and non-Native scholars 
may make; of the kinds of critiques offered; and of the kinds of information 
requested are always appropriate. Of course it is the case that ultimately, as 
Littlefield quotes Oren Lyons, Indians "will determine what [Indian] culture is." 
(95) But this is one of those instances where it isn't clear whether the "Indians" 
we are talking about are traditional people on the reservations or academic Indians 
(or both). In any case, neither one of these groups, for better or for worse, will 
determine what Indian culture is in a manner entirely independent of the culture 
of Euro-Americans, of the U.S. government, the state bureacracies, and the 
omnipresent "media." 
Nor will they—again, for better or for worse—determine what it is indepen-
dently of non-Native inquiries into Indian culture. When M. Annette Jaimes 
criticizes scholarly journals and academic presses for not undertaking "American 
Indian Studies efforts per se," and then calls for "an autonomous Indian tradition 
of intellectualism" (Littlefield 98) one must pause. Indian studies "per sel" The 
Latin phrase itself denies the meaning of what it would convey: what "autono-
mous tradition of intellectualism" "per se?" I am not looking to score easy points 
(and I will come back to this very important question of "autonomy" and 
"sovereignty"); I am simply trying to show that the discourse of some of the 
Indian scholars Littlefield cites denies, in its very texture, that for which it would 
speak. 
(It is exactly for this reason that I have raised the question of the distinction 
between rhetoric and dialectic. Inasmuch as I am quite certain that Native scholars 
are entirely capable of the most sophisticated logical arguments, I can't help but 
wonder, as I noted above, whether some of the remarks quoted by Littlefield 
aren't offered primarily for rhetorical/polemical/political effect, a possibility 
Littlefield either doesn't recognize or one he doesn't choose to consider.) 
While some of the Indian determiners of Indian culture invoked by Oren 
Lyons may well be people who will do the determining by engaging in ritual and 
ceremonial activities, telling stories, producing material culture, Littlefield's talk 
is mostly about—as he says himself^Indian scholars trained in and for the most 
part based in the universities, published largely by academic presses, occasion-
ally supported by grants from the federal and state governments, and from private 
foundations. These Indians will "determine" what Indian culture is by represent-
ing it in writing and in speech, in articles and books and talks—all of which are 
subject to the very same problems faced by non-Indian representers of Indian (or 
any other) culture. Insofar as this is the case, it is difficult to see what advantages 
the representations of Native scholars must automatically, a priori and per se 
have over the representations of non-Native scholars. 
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This is why Littlefield's focus on identity questions—us/them, Indians/non-
Indians—in my view badly confuses the issue. For while it is unquestionably the 
case that who produces the representation is "epistemically salient," in Linda 
Alcoff s phrase (to which I will return below)10, and that the "social location" of 
the speaker provides a context that must be taken into account, nonetheless, 
identity and positionality can only "bear upon" (my references are again to 
Alcoff) not determine the nature and quality of any representational speech act11. 
More needs to be said about this important matter. Nonetheless, I will turn, here, 
to what Littlefield never does say explicitly, for all that I find it strongly implied 
in his remarks, that the very fact of an Indian identity (a very complex and 
contested fact!) might somehow in itself convey a privileged access to authentic 
knowledge of Indian history/culture/literature. 
2. The problem of essentialization. 
Littlefield speaks of Indian "journalism organizations . . . developing 
guidelines for non-Indian journalists who write about Indians." (101) So long as 
these are "guidelines" rather than attempts at pre-publication censorship—I 
assume we are, indeed, talking about journalism and not about inquiry into sacred 
and ceremonial matters—this might be a useful thing. But, then, why not 
guidelines for Indian journalists who write about Indians as well? 
Feminist scholars know perfectly well that to be born a woman is not 
necessarily to be a feminist; in spite of the color of his skin, few would be entirely 
comfortable with Justice Clarence Thomas's perspectives on African-American 
culture. In the same way, the very fact of Indianness or Indian identification 
provides no guarantee of any particular scholarly or critical expertise. As T.S. 
Eliot wrote in the "Dry Salvages," "We had the experience but missed the 
meaning." It is always possible to have the experience but miss the meaning—or 
to offer meanings that others who have had the same or virtually the same 
experience would contest. To know that a particular scholar is a white male is not 
necessarily to know what he thinks—about white males, about Indians, about 
anything else. Same with knowing that a particular scholar is an Indian, male or 
female. 
Wendy Rose, who is both a Native poet and an anthropologist, writes that 
when she is "called upon to speak anthropologically," she finds herself "apolo-
gizing or stammering that [she's] not that kind of anthropologist."12 Of course 
today, there are also a fair number of non-Native anthropologists who are "not 
that kind of anthropologist" either.13 The issue is not strictly whether you are a 
Native or a non-Native anthropologist, but what kind of anthropologist you are. 
This is not to deny the importance (or the lived reality) of having the 
experience of being Indian; it is to point to the obvious fact that Indian experience 
is not always and everywhere the same, nor is it ever unproblematically given to 
consciousness (nor is consciousness unproblematically represented in writing, 
etc.). All experience must be interpreted, and even people who have the "same" 
experience—the inverted commas indicate the differences inevitable in any 
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"sameness"—may interpret it differently, reaching very different conclusions 
about what their experience means and the uses to which that meaning may be put 
in any attempt to understand Native American culture/history/literature. 
As it is false and irresponsible to offer essentialized generalizations about 
what Indians feel, know, think, or understand, so, too, is it false and irresponsible 
to offer essentialized generalizations about what non-Indians feel, know, think, 
or understand. The Native/non-Native dichotomy, the thoroughly fictive we/ 
them that appears in quotation after quotation from Native American scholars in 
Littlefield's essay, simply inverts and thereby perpetuates the opposition that (as 
I noted earlier) Littlefield wants to undo. Not only are there abundant differences 
among non-Native scholars, but, again, abundant differences among Native 
scholars, too—differences which bear directly on the possible organization of 
Native American or Indian Studies in relation to American Studies, the subject I 
will take up in my concluding section. 
I hope it will have been clear that I am not arguing against generalization of 
any kind in favor of a focus on a finite but impossibly large sample of "unique" 
individual instances. Social and political thought requires attention to collectivi-
ties, to the category of "American Indians" and "Euro-Americans," to the 
difference between a historically-specific indigenous population and a popula-
tion of colonist-settlers. And there are historically-specific and general state-
ments that can be made about Indians or Euro-Americans. What I have been 
arguing against is the essentialized version of the general, the type of statement 
that precisely is not historically specific in its assumption that to be an Indian 
(whatever that may mean) is always and everywhere to be this, that, or the other 
foreknown thing; that to be of European background (whatever that may mean) 
is to be this, that, or the other foreknown thing. 
Nonetheless, just as I believe that the criticism of literature by women should 
not predominantly be in the hands of men; just as I believe that the criticism of 
literature by African-American people should not predominantly be in the hands 
of Euro-Americans; so, too, do I believe that the criticism of literature by Native 
American people should not predominantly be in the hands of non-Native people. 
But there is a big difference between believing that and believing that Indians, 
simply by being Indian (and I note yet again that being Indian is not always and 
everywhere the same thing), are automatically and inevitably the most competent 
for every task involving the interpretation and understanding of Indian history/ 
culture/literature. In regard to this matter as well, I would take issue with M. 
Annette Jaimes—while also offering substantial agreement—when she writes in 
her Introduction to The State of Native America, that 
while most of the contributors to this book are themselves 
Native American—and thus can be said to speak with an 
"Indian voice"—others are not. The latter number among those 
who have already opened their eyes to the lessons of their 
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history, do not wish to see it continue to be repeated and have 
therefore joined hands with their indigenous relatives.14 
I would wish to number among those latter non-Natives, and I applaud Jaimes's 
willingness to include them/us. But the Native American contributors to her book 
cannot "be said to speak with an 'Indian voice'," in the singular. In what would 
that voice consist? how would one know it when one heard it? Of the Native 
contributors to Jaimes's book, Jimmie Durham does not sound like Wendy Rose; 
neither of them sounds like John Mohawk, and both of them on occasion sound 
at least a little bit like Jim Vander Wall, a non-Native contributor. I doubt whether 
Jaimes or anyone else would be able to guess, were I or some Native person to read 
passages from the work of these and any number of Native and non-Native 
scholars, which authors were Native and which non-Native. (Or perhaps the claim 
might be made that, indeed, Indians always do recognize other Indians . . . . ) 
But, again, for all my strenuous objections to the positing of a unitary and 
essentialized "Indian voice," which implies, of course, a unitary andessentialized 
"non-Indian voice"; for all my insistence that the quality or value of a thought is 
not entirely dependent on the race, gender, or culture of the thinker; still, no 
thought occurs in a vacuum, and so it is indeed important to take into account the 
formation of the thinker. Who one is, and where one speaks from, as Linda Alcoff 
has made clear in the essay I cited above, are, indeed—I repeat the phrase from 
Alcoff—"epistemically salient." (7) But who one is—identity—and where one 
speaks from—location—means "social location, or social identity," and social 
locations and identities are plural, complex, and constructed. Identities are not, as 
in the essentialized Native/non-Native opposition, unitary, simple, and fixed or 
given in advance. Thus the various aspects of any particular person's identity may 
be, as Alcoff explains, socially empowering or disempowering. 
One may ask, for example, whether a white male who speaks from Florida 
Atlantic University is more or less privileged than an Indian male who speaks 
from Stanford or UCLA. Does it change things if the white male is Jewish or one 
of the Indian males part-Jewish? What is the oppressor/oppressed equation when 
Native American women defend a Native male against charges of sexism raised 
by non-Native women? or when Indian women raise the issue of sexism on the 
part of Indian men? Is a lesbian Indian scholar at a triple disadvantage in relation 
to white, male, "straight" scholars? Questions of this sort might easily be 
multiplied for all that there are no easy answers to them. The point to make, 
however, is that these questions are always to the point, so that reliance on 
essentialized categories like Native/non-Native is an obstacle to real critical 
work. Any answer to the question, Who speaks? does not automatically convey 
the kind and quality of the speech. 
3. Legal sovereignty, cultural autonomy, "political correctness." 
I have no expertise in the law and I will base my comments on legal 
sovereignty on Littlefield's account in which legal sovereignty seems to refer to 
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such things as the right protected by law for Indian people to determine for 
themselves their social organization, religious practices, education, land use, and 
so on, as well as the right to determine which non-Indians are or are not permitted 
access to Indian lands. Whether one speaks of "tribes" or "nations"—the two are 
regularly synonomous in American discourse, for all that in the African context 
the terms are radically discrete15—legal sovereignty also affirms the right of tribes 
or nations to determine which persons are members of those tribes or nations. The 
legally operative question as I understand it is not so much, Who is an Indian? but, 
rather, Who is a Cherokee, or Lakota, or Navajo. Sovereignty means that 
Cherokee, Lakota, or Navajo people get to decide that as a matter of law.16 
But even as a matter of law, there is no sovereignty in an absolute sense. 
Native Peoples are not and should not be thought to be "domestic dependent 
nations," in Chief Justice John Marshall's famous or infamous phrase; rather they 
are and should be thought to be domestic independent nations. Nevertheless, 
inasmuch as Indian control of Indian affairs is hedged 'round with acts of 
Congress, Supreme Court rulings, BIA regulations, and the like, we are, in 
practice, talking about a relative sovereignty, about degrees of sovereignty. Thus, 
while in theory, legal sovereignty and cultural autonomy seem to be quite 
different—in that sovereignty seems digital like on/off, either you have it or you 
don't, while cultural autonomy is analogue, like loud/soft, hot/cold a matter of 
more or less—in actual practice, they are quite the same in that both are 
conjunctural and refer materially to the outcomes of negotiations between Native 
tribes or nations and a multiplicity of non-Native institutions and entities. 
I've already quoted Littlefield's citation of M. Annette Jaimes's desire "to 
make American Indian studies 'an autonomous Indian tradition of intellectual-
ism' . . ." (98); William Willard and Mary Kay Downing cite Terry Wilson's 1979 
concern to base Native American studies on "a uniquely American Indian 
perspective."17 Again, one must wonder in what such autonomy or uniqueness 
could actually consist. One may fantasize the history of the Americas had 
Columbus's three little boats sunk shortly after setting out; but the fact remains 
that from 1492 on, neither Euro-American intellectuals nor Native American 
intellectuals could operate autonomously or uniquely, in a manner fully indepen-
dent of one another, for all the differences in power relations. It is difficult to 
understand what M. Annette Jaimes had in mind when she called, for example, 
for the study of Native American philosophy in a distinctly non-comparative 
framework, autonomously, uniquely, whatever.18 Is it not the case that such study 
would base itself upon written texts in large part? And everyone concerned with 
these matters cannot help but know that writing already denotes the absence of 
Native autonomy. From the first appearance of Europeans in the southwest and 
northeast, Native American persons took account of Western ideas and artifacts, 
rejecting some, accepting and modifying others for their use. But the notion of a 
post-contact Indian tradition that is "autonomous," insofar as the notion of 
autonomy means to suggest a kind of radical independence from Euroamerican 
influence, seems a nostalgic fantasy or a polemical device. 
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(And, as I have said before and will say again just below, I think it is largely 
a polemical device. Jaimes, at any rate, seems to have shifted her position, calling 
recently not for "autonomy" but for "Eurocentric parochialism [to] yield[... ] to 
the more inclusive pluralistic project,"19 an intersection, as I take it, with the 
important project of "critical multiculturalism," as proposed by Turner and 
others.) 
Thus when Robert Warrior calls for more attention to the work of the Indian 
intellectuals, John Joseph Mathews and Vine Deloria, Jr., he is pointing to a 
fruitful source of further study. When, however, he claims that attention to the 
work of these Indian intellectuals can serve to advance the cause of "intellectual 
sovereignty," one must pause. The thought of Mathews and Deloria can no more 
be understood without reference to the Western tradition than can Warrior's. It 
can reasonably be suggested that further attention to Mathews and Deloria, to, 
perhaps, John Milton Oskison, Francis LaFlesche, and a great many other 
formidable Native intellectuals might, at this historical juncture, be more impor-
tant than continued attention to any of a number of non-Native intellectuals. Apart 
from that, the only thing "intellectual sovereignty" can mean is, Let's take it back! 
And, of course, that is exactly what it does mean. Littlefield writes that Warrior's 
"statement might be seen as further evidence of what others have called 'the 
growing movement among American Indians to wrest control of their cultural 
identity and history from non-Indians.'" (107) 
I have no problem with the Indians taking it back, or wresting control. Pam 
Colorado's concern that non-Indians will have "complete power to define what 
is and is not Indian, even for Indians," and her fear that "the last vestiges of real 
Indian society and Indian rights will disappear [because] Non-Indians will then 
'own' our heritage and ideas as thoroughly as they now claim to own our land and 
resources" arises from a specific historical and social analysis.20 There is indeed 
such a thing as cultural imperialism, and the question of who gets to tell the stories, 
who gets to have their representations circulated and attended to is a question that 
has not had of late, so far as I am aware, many happy answers.21 The Native 
scholars Littlefield cites want to gain increased access to publishing outlets, 
university positions, grants, awards, and honors, and thus, insofar as their 
representations differ from those of non-Natives, to be in a stronger position to 
contest them. I am all for this—but, again, it is important to recognize that there 
is no way of knowing a priori what representations Native scholars are likely to 
make that non-Indians can't or won't make, no way of knowing a priori that their 
representations are likely to be "better," "more accurate," more politically 
empowering than the representations of non-Indians. In the same way, it is not 
possible to know in advance whether the representations and activities of the 
"Indian scholars" will be of more use to the "Indians" in every case than the 
representations and activities of the non-Indian scholars. 
Warrior's suggestion that American Indian literature be seen as "a literature 
of resistance to colonialism," and that it be compared "to other literatures of 
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resistance" (in Willard and Downing 2, and in Littlefield 105) is, once more, a 
useful one. But the suggestion has two parts. The first part simply assumes what 
needs to be demonstrated: is all American Indian literature "a literature of 
resistance to colonialism?" Perhaps it is—although, once more, this remains to be 
shown. If it is, then, should it be compared "to other literatures of resistance?" If 
so, we might number among these "literatures of resistance" not only "African-
American, African, or Arab," as suggested by Warrior, but as well those of 
Catholics in Northern Ireland, Jews in the republics of "The Former Soviet 
Union," and other "whites"—like, for example, the Frenchman, Philippe Soupault 
writing in resistance to the Vichy government during World War II in the French 
colonies of North Africa—along with Czechs and Poles, etc. These "literatures 
of resistance" Warrior's narrowly informed account firmly, if rather surrepti-
tiously, excludes.22 
But how would any commitment to comparativism square with Warrior's 
and Littlefield's insistence—I cite here only Littlefield's words—that "American 
Indian literature is literature in its own right, not by virtue of its juxtaposition to 
American literature?" (106) As a resistance literature, "American Indian litera-
ture" apparently is to be "juxtaposed" to other literatures of resistance; what, then, 
of the (delusionary or purely polemical) commitment to "autonomy," the "in its 
own right" business? Confusions of this sort abound in Warrior's writing and in 
Littlefield's. 
Littlefield modestly encourages Indian "control" by affirming that Native 
people need to "question jargon-filled, poorly reasoned presentations." (107) 
Yes, of course: but I would again warn against the dangers of essentialization and 
the double bind in any claims to cultural autonomy and intellectual sovereignty. 
Native American scholars are as capable of poor reasoning and a recourse to 
jargon as anyone else (and names, here, definitely could be named), and this, too, 
will need to be challenged both by Native and non-Native scholars alike—who, 
if they must not romanticize by failing to criticize, must not be too quickly charged 
with racism or ethnocentrism if they do. 
There is another danger in modelling the cultural or intellectual realm on the 
theoretical logic of legal sovereignty rather than its material practice, a danger 
alluded to by the third term of this section's title, the issue of political correctness. 
Littlefield claims that Native people's ability to "determin[e] who is or is not one 
of them . . . " is "basic to tribal or Indian national sovereignty," and he adds that 
Indians "have done fairly well at policing their ranks." (97) Perhaps they have, 
and perhaps this is a necessary thing on the political level. Still, I find a bit 
troubling the way in which Littlefield metaphorically extends the concept of 
police work to the cultural level, as, for example, when he speaks of Indian 
scholars prepared "to challenge outsiders who happen to venture onto their tribal 
or cultural turf." (99) Apart from the macho-desperate connotations of urban gang 
warfare, is this the best way to understand cultural contention? as a battle of 
insiders vs. outsiders? (this opposition, unfortunately, pervades Littlefield's 
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discourse). Are "culture" and "turf' strictly compatible terms? When Littlefield 
asserts his view that "American Indian studies" can act as "the defender of the 
cultural and historical "parameters' of the discipline," (99) his unexamined 
infatuation with defensive militancy threatens to obscure the issue entirely. 
I say this because it seems to me that the question of just what, exactly, "the 
cultural and historical "parameters' of the discipline" of American Indian studies 
may be is at the very core of this debate. Disciplinary "parameters" and political 
boundaries have much in common, to be sure. Both may shift and change, and 
both do so in response to fluctuations in power relations that involve not only 
cultural but economic factors as well. But disciplinary parameters, it seems to me, 
are somewhat less constrained by their material historicity—i.e., their real 
institutional existence in the academy—than are political boundaries. Disciplin-
ary parameters are as much conceptual as geo-physical, as much constituted by 
discourse about them as by (academic) realpolitik—which, I believe, has a 
somewhat greater quotient of responsiveness (this may be naive on my part) to the 
outcomes of discursive encounters than the politics of nation-states. Insofar as 
this may be true, neither Littlefield nor I can be very sure of just what, at the 
moment we speak, these "parameters" actually are, inasmuch as it is in the nature 
of "disciplinary parameters" always to be in the process of being established or 
re-established. Their existence at any given moment, as many of us have argued 
recently about the "canon," is not threatened by cultural contention so much as 
it is precisely (and fortunately) the product of cultural contention. 
Further, Littlefield's fondness for metaphors of attack/defense obscures the 
fact that what I have just called the "discursive encounters" that enter into the 
always-provisional definition of "disciplinary parameters" may be more nearly 
dialogic encounters than oppositional ones, not so much "attacks" or "defenses" 
(of "turf or whatever) as conversations among interested parties. All this is 
obviously to say that I am a good deal less enthusiastic than Littlefield about the 
beneficial effects of "policing" the ranks of tribal or national sovereignty on the 
level of culture. I can't help but recall, for example, that this police work, 
whatever its salutary effects, excluded Jimmie Durham from exhibitions of 
"Native American art," and prevented Lloyd Oxendine from showing at the very 
gallery he directs at the American Indian Community House, in New York. 
Littlefield's disapproving reference to "scholars [who] continue to intrude into 
what should be Indian business" (97) misunderstands the nature of culture as a 
practice—for all that, as I shall try to explain in a moment, there are definitely 
some aspects of Native culture that are indeed "Indian business." 
Let me offer an example of the sort of intellectual police work I find 
objectionable. Littlefield cites Elizabeth Cook-Lynn's comments on Hertha 
Wong's Preface to Sending My Heart Back Across the Years, in which Wong 
begins by announcing her recent discovery that she is part Cherokee. Cook-Lynn 
calls Wong's remarks "wannabee sentiment which clutters an otherwise tolerable 
piece of redundant scholarship." (Littlefield 106) I agree with Cook-Lynn that 
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this part of Wong's Preface is coy and potentially opportunistic, and I believe 
Cook-Lynn is correct in her judgment that some of the book is indeed "redun-
dant." But Wong's first three chapters—Chapter 1 attempting to deduce a sense 
of "Native American . . . Autobiography Theory," Chapter 2 dealing with coup 
tales, vision stories, and, especially naming practices, and Chapter 3 with 
'Tictographs as Autobiography"—offer some observations that are not strictly 
"redundant" nor merely "tolerable." 
What I am objecting to is, first, the ad hominem—in this case adfeminam— 
attack (the "wannabee" denomination and the contemptuous tone) and, second, 
the wholesale dismissal of a book ("an otherwise tolerable piece of redundant 
scholarship") some parts of which at least can stand as a serious contribution to 
the study of Native American autobiography. Cook-Lynn's intervention seems 
less an act of scholarship than apolice action intended to warn white "wannabees," 
or maybe non-Indians generally, to keep out. It will remain for Indian people to 
decide officially and unofficially whether Wong is or is not Cherokee. But 
evaluation of her work cannot be strictly dependent on her identity. To denigrate 
her work in the way Cook-Lynn has done is an anti-intellectual and counter-
productive gesture that, whatever short term benefits it may seem to have, in the 
long run can only retard the understanding of Native American literatures. 
Moreover, it plays into the hands of cultural conservatives like Wilcomb 
Washburn, Dinesh D'Souza, Allen Bloom, and David Horowitz, editor of 
Heterodoxy, Articles and Animadversions on Political Correctness and Other 
Follies, who readily seize upon such things as Cook-Lynn's dismissal of Wong 
as instances of thought-policing in the interest of enforcing the politically-correct 
line. Individual instances of such police work are then generalized as typical of 
the field of Native American/American Indian Studies as a whole. This generali-
zation is then used to support the argument that it is not Eurocentrism, racism, or 
a commitment to the privileges of the status quo that marginalize Indian culture/ 
history/literature studies, but only the intellectual disreputability of the field 
itself. 
The field, of course, is not intellectually disreputable nor is Cook-Lynn's 
cryptic dismissal of Hertha Wong's work typical of the field as a whole. But it 
becomes more difficult to speak on behalf of the field against its conservative 
detractors when policing metaphors and a language of turf defending, as in 
Littlefield's essay, are so carelessly approved. 
4. To whom does culture "belong?": on the transmission and production of 
"knowledge." 
The form of the question in the first part of my heading is given by Littlefield 
in one of his several references to Robert Warrior. Warrior is specifically 
criticizing me for what he deems my effort to have "Native American literature 
'belong' to the national literature of the United States." (in Littlefield 105) I have 
indeed taken the position that Native American literatures be included among the 
several literatures that make up American literature, and that American literature 
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itself be included in the broader category of a global or international literature, 
what I've called a "cosmopolitan" literature. 
I don't, however, anywhere in my discussion, use the word "belong." But 
Warrior puts the word in quotation marks. Why? To call it into question, it would 
seem: but he can only be questioning his own use of the term, not mine; "belong" 
is his word, for all that the quotation marks suggest something else, an outright 
falsification. Littlefield has not, of course, looked up the reference (most people 
will not look up the reference), and uncritically follows Warrior, saying, "The 
literature [Native Americans] produce does not 'belong' to America" (105)—as 
if anyone but Warrior had suggested that it might. 
William Willard and Mary Kay Downing accurately quote what I say on this 
matter, which is that 
Indian literatures ought to be included in the canon of Ameri-
can literature so that they might illuminate and interact with 
the texts of the dominant, Euroamerican culture, to produce a 
genuinely heterodox national canon, (in Willard and Downing, 
2) 
Clearly what I call "inclusion," for Warrior means possession, and I can only 
again protest his presentation of his own interpretation as though it were an exact 
quotation, the apparent attribution to me of the word "belongs." 
Nonetheless, it's worth looking into this matter of what, culturally, can 
"belong" to whom. To begin, we might try to distinguish between cultural 
artifacts, "culture," and "knowledge." Further, in regard to what I have called 
cultural artifacts and "knowledge," we also have to distinguish between that 
which is sacred and that which is secular—recognizing, all the while, that such 
distinctions, while extremely important for American scholars whatever their 
racial or cultural origins, are understood rather differently by traditional Native 
people. 
A cultural artifact like a Navajo bracelet can "belong" to an individual or a 
group, to its maker and his family.23 But Navajo jewelry-making—an expression 
of Navajo culture—can't actually "belong" to any individual Navajo or, collec-
tively, to Navajo people generally in quite the same way. For that to be the case, 
one would have to reify culture, mistakenly turning an extremely complicated 
concept into a thing. Navajo people may feel uniquely empowered to speak of 
Navajo-jewelry making, but jewelry-making does not thereby "belong" to the 
Navajo in the way a single ring or bracelet may. 
But what, then, of Hopi kachina masks? They do belong to certain clans, but 
what of the knowledge of how to make them? On one hand, inasmuch as this is 
an aspect of Hopi culture, and inasmuch as culture is the conceptualization of a 
set of practices, it might be said that knowledge of Hopi mask-making, like 
knowledge of Navajo jewelry-making can't belong to anyone either. But if the 
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cultural artifacts involved are sacred, and sacred knowledge is involved, any 
secular scholar who does not want to operate in a grossly imperial mode will have 
to shift gears and abandon the Western scientific ideal of the free access to 
knowledge, and respect the very different Hopi view of the matter. This, of course, 
is exactly what Ekkehart Malotki did not do in the instance cited by Littlefield, 
with the result that Hopi people acted to take back what "belonged" to them, and 
(appropriately, in my view) declared Malotki persona non grata. 
I would suggest that a very great deal of what is currently understood as 
constituting the category of Native American literature is more like Navajo 
jewelry-making than Hopi mask-making, and cannot, therefore, actually belong 
to any individual or group. This is most particularly the case with Native 
American written literature, which—to repeat—by its written nature is an 
intercultural practice, and by its published nature is available to a general 
audience. Native American people may feel a special relation to Native American 
literature, and feel that relation as conferring a particular authority to speak of it, 
but contemporary Native American literature is a conjunctural practice, not a 
thing, and as apractice, like Navajo jewelry making—also a conjunctural practice 
inasmuch as the Navajo learned many of their jewelry making techniques from 
Mexicans—cannot "belong" to any single group. 
This is true as well for a good deal of oral literature. Once there is a degree 
of circulation of stories, e.g., once narrators permit "outside" auditors to record, 
translate, and publish stories, then—again—while "insiders" may be especially 
well-positioned to speak of these stories, there is no ground on which they can 
claim sole rights to possession. People with different socio-cultural identities and 
different social locations will have different relations to these materials and these 
may indeed cause them to speak about and represent them differently. But it 
remains to be said yet again that one cannot know a priori the nature and force 
of such speech and representation. In practice, post-colonial practice, the lines 
that once separated "us" from "them" have begun to give way, permitting entry 
to space in which dialogue may occur. Or, at least, that is what I hope might occur; 
and I can only repeat that it is disturbing to note Littlefield's attraction to the 
notion of patrolling arbitrary perimeters and parameters. 
For all of this, it remains the case that not "literature" but certain traditional 
oral stories, and ceremonial knowledge of a more nearly sacred kind, like certain 
material artifacts, can and do "belong" to particular lineages of storytellers, to 
particular clans, or persons. Knowledge of these things is transmitted rather than 
produced and I want, here, to turn to the distinction between the transmission and 
production of knowledge. American scholars—intellectuals, critics, and persons 
engaged in cultural studies—are all producers of knowledge. Littlefield, Jaimes, 
Cook-Lynn, Wong, Warrior, and I (among others) do not simply transmit a 
relatively fixed body of information; rather, we select from an ever-increasing 
amount of resource materials what we find of interest or value, interpreting those 
materials and producing a discourse about them. To use again the title of a 
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wellknown collection of essays, we "write culture." An experiential closeness to 
the material selected can be an advantage or a disadvantage to the critic; so, too, 
can experiential distance be helpful or detrimental to the critical production of 
useful knowledge. Insider or outsider status does not determine results a priori; 
even "wannabees" might produce good work, and there are no secure grounds for 
limiting the critical field to one group or another. As I have said above, it is not 
so much the identity of the person producing the representation as the kind and 
quality of the representation that must be judged. 
This is not the case, however, in situations where there is not the production 
but the transmission of knowledge. The Hopi people who have so far successfully 
kept Malotki' s book off the shelves were preventing an interference in established 
circuits of transmission: the knowledge involved is, indeed, relatively fixed, and 
it does "belong" to specifiable persons and groups, more like a bracelet or 
ceremonial mask than like jewelry-making or literature. To wrench such knowl-
edge from its traditionally circumscribed transmissional circuits, thus opening it 
to the unlimited circulation of produced knowledge is a violation of trust and 
propriety, and actions to prevent such violation constitute legitimate exercises of 
sovereignty. It is not so much that this kind of knowledge "belongs" to Hopi 
persons as that Hopi, who have not themselves published such knowledge, nor 
produced it in interaction with the knowledge of the dominant culture, have strong 
claims to exclusive control. This situation, as I have tried to show, differs radically 
from the scholarly production of knowledge focused on Native American 
literature as a cultural practice. 
5. American Studies and Native American Studies in the era of 
multiculturalism. 
Everyone knows that cultural conservatives like Allan Bloom, William 
Bennett, Lynne Cheney, and others overtly or covertly committed to the primacy 
of the traditions of Europe are generally opposed to what has come to be called— 
not always clearly or consistently—multiculturalism. But champions of the 
vitality and integrity of Native American traditions are not therefore necessarily 
in favor of multiculturalism. That there is not a uniformity of opinion among 
Native or non-Native American scholars—no "we" of any kind readily to be 
invoked—is perhaps nowhere so apparent as in regard to the issue of 
multiculturalism. 
Thus, Jimmie Durham writes that "institutions in the United States are 
already reinforcing racism by celebrating 'multiculturalism'." This celebration, 
he continues, "makes intervention on our [Native Americans's] part more 
difficult."24 Durham's remarks come near the end of M. Annette Jaimes's 
important collection, The State of Native America, which has, near its beginning, 
the rather different perception of Evelyn Hu-DeHart who writes: 
For those of us in the academy and the publishing world who 
subscribe to the multicultural project, our responsibility is to 
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find ample space beyond tokenism for Native American schol-
arship and discourse.25 
Durham doesn't elaborate his reasons for equating multiculturalism with a 
reinforcement of racism, although I suspect these are rather like those offered by 
Hazel Carby (cf. Carby: multiculturalism is "one of the current code words for 
race... "
26) and others who see the dominant society as willing, under the banner 
of multiculturalism, to offer small doses of (at least the appearance of) cultural 
equality as a substitute for social, economic, and political equality. Hu-Dehart is 
also quite obviously aware of the tokenist dangers of multiculturalism, for all that 
she sees these as dangers to the project, not as inherent in the project. 
I want to conclude this lengthy response to the issues raised by Daniel 
Littlefield by reflecting on how Native American Studies might define itself in 
what I've called the era of multiculturalism. Different definitions, of course, 
imply different values—or, at least, different emphases—as these seek to express 
themselves by different arrangements in the academy. Among the many models 
and possibilities are: separate American Indian Studies/Native American Studies 
departments or programs; Native American Studies as a component of an Ethnic 
Studies department or program; Native American Studies (as in Mario Garcia's 
view which I cite just below) as part of American Studies departments or 
programs, and so on. 
For Mario Garcia, whose work has been in the area of Chicano or Latino 
studies, American studies and ethnic studies need to come together "to negotiate 
a new type of intellectual popular front or a new form of historical bloc, one based 
on an equal and democratic relationship."27 Earlier, Patrick Morris called for 
Native American Studies "to be intellectually broad and integrative, utilizing all 
academic disciplines and methodologies to search, identify and address the 
critical issues relevant to the Native Community." (in Willard and Downing 2) 
Willard and Downing speak of "American Indian/Native American Studies [as] 
preparing the way toward inter-cultural education," ( 1 ) their term "inter-cultural" 
apparently synonomous with most uses of multicultural. I think M. Annette 
Jaimes has moved to something like this position as well, when, near the end of 
her introduction to The State of Native America she writes: 
Despite the fact of our coming from different traditions, we are 
now singing to the same drum, locked together in our common 
humanity and our common destiny. (10) 
But some still hold to Russell Thornton ' s 1978 concern to see "Indian Studies 
as a separate discipline." (in Willard and Downing 6) Cook-Lynn, for example, 
is on record as wanting Indian studies to exist as an "alternative regime of 
intellectual thought... not only through content but through methodology." (11) 
What comes up again and again is the sense that the "integrity" of Native 
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American Studies can only be maintained by its separation from multicultural or 
American studies, as, again, in Cook-Lynn's assertion that "The integrity of what 
we do comes from the sober understanding of, and the regulating, and defending 
of the parameters of that discipline . . . . " (11) 
I disagree with this view because I believe it to be both flawed in its logic and 
mistaken in its assessment of practical possibility. But I take it very seriously. 
How could Native people not be wary of an aggressive majority's sudden offer 
to come in and share, the offer of an inclusion that might well be just another way 
to appropriate, absorb, and nullify? Cook-Lynn, in the essay from which I have 
quoted just above, insists that worries about the possible ghetto-ization of Native 
American Studies programs that insist on their separateness or "autonomy" from 
multicultural, ethnic, or, indeed American Studies programs are just a way of 
trying to keep Indians from doing things their own way; and, to be sure, there is 
something to that, too. 
But a commitment to separatism, as Joan Wallach Scott has written, "is a 
simultaneous refusal and imitation of the powerful."28 Because our histories are 
entwined, "no group is without connection or relation to any other, even if these 
are hierarchical, conflicted, and contradictory relations." (75) To deny this is to 
practice what Fernando Coronil calls "Occidentalism" as a 
complex ensemble of representational strategies engaged in 
the production of conceptions of the world that a) separates its 
components into bounded units; b) disaggregates their rela-
tional histories; c) turns differences into hierarchy; d) natural-
izes these representations; and therefore e) intervenes, how-
ever unwittingly, in the reproduction of existing asymmetri cal 
power relations, (in Turner 18-19) 
Of course it remains to be seen if in practice as well as theory we can achieve 
community without homogeneity, what Scott refers to as "communities of 
difference." (76) 
The major "difference" scholars committed to a separate Native American 
Studies curriculum may assert is not, I believe, a difference of content or 
methodology but, rather, one of purpose. In Patrick Morris's words, "It is [a] 
definitive commitment to the Native community and people, rather than to 
academics alone, that distinguishes Native American Studies from other aca-
demic disciplines." (in Willard and Downing, 2) Certainly Native scholars will 
feel this "commitment" more powerfully and immediately than most non-Native 
scholars—although I suspect that not many non-Native scholars in this field 
would admit to being committed to "academics alone." 
Louis Owens has wittily written of "the current tendency of critics to 
consider Bakhtin as a topical ointment applicable to virtually any critical 
abrasion," continuing that "Bakhtinian analysis strikes [him] nonetheless as a 
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valuable tool "29 It is Bakhtin that I, too, would invoke to note that a "dialogic" 
approach to the issues I have been discussing may well be useful. To take Bakhtin 
seriously—and I haven't the space, obviously, to detail what that would mean— 
is to go beyond a vague pluralism or an untheorized commitment to diversity to 
a recognition that our speech and thought—and my plural pronoun refers to 
anyone who speaks and thinks about these matters—is inevitably implicated in 
the speech and thought of others. Postcolonial work on Native American history/ 
culture/literature cannot help but occur in what Mary Louise Pratt has called 
"contact zones,"30 for all that we have usually tended to think of "contact zones" 
as somewhere "out there," rather than just "here," quite close to wherever we 
think of as home. Work on the "borders" as defined by Guillermo Gomez-Pena, 
Ramon and Jose David Saldivar, and others will be what I myself have called 
"ethnocritical" work.31 What this work will ultimately be like of course remains 
to be seen. 
I will conclude by offering my belief, not merely my hope, that postcolonial 
work in Native American history/culture/literature will indeed create the "we" 
that Daniel Littlefield theoretically posits but in practice denies. "We" are and 
will be those scholars, Native and non-Native, who, whatever we see as our most 
immediate commitments, ultimately, in Edward Said's phrase, work to produce 
"noncoercive knowledge in the interests of human freedom."32 
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